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Abstract
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compliance  can be estimated using readily available  data  in the United States.
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It is known that errors in the incomes reported in surveys have important implications for
measures of poverty and inequality based on those surveys (Van Praag et al.,  1983; Chakravarty
and Eichhorn,  1994; Ravallion,  1994; Cowell and Victoria-Feser,  1996;  Chesher and  Schluter,
2002).  For example, classical  measurement error in the reported incomes of sampled households
leads to over-estimation of standard inequality measures (Chakravarty  and Eichorn,  1994).
Chesher and Schluter (2002) derive formulae for correcting a number of  poverty and inequality
measures  for multiplicative measurement error in the underlying individual welfare levels,
assuming that the sample is representative of the relevant population.
A measurement issue that has received less attention is the fact that it is invariably the
case that some sampled households simply do not participate  in surveys, either because they
explicitly refuse to do so or nobody is at home.  In the literature,  this is often called "unit non-
response" and is distinct from "item non-response," which occurs when some of the sampled
households  who agree to participate refuse to answer questions on their incomes. Various
imputation/matching  methods address item non-response by exploiting the questions that are
answered (Lilard et al.,  1986; Little and Rubin,  1987).  However, that is not an option for unit
non-response.  Some surveys make efforts to avoid unit non-response, using "call-backs" to non-
responding households  and fees paid to those who agree to be interviewed.2 Nonetheless, the
problem is practically unavoidable  and non-response rates of 10% or higher are common;  indeed,
we know of national surveys  for which 30% of those sampled did not comply.3
2  On reducing bias using call-backs  see Deming (1953), Van Praag et al. (1983), Alho (1990),  and
Nijman and Verbeek (1992). On the economics  of incentive payments  see Philipson (1997).
3  Scott and Steele (2002) report non-response rates for eight countries, ranging from virtually zero
to 26%. Holt and Elliot (1991)  quote a range of 15-30%  for surveys in the UK. Philipson (1997) reports a
mean non-response rate of 21% for surveys by the National Opinion Research Center in the U.S.
2How does unit non-response affect survey-based measures of poverty and inequality? To
the extent that compliance  is random, there will be no bias. However, just as income constrains
almost all behavior,  it undoubtedly matters to choices about compliance with sample
assignments.  For instance, high-income households might be less likely to participate because of
a high opportunity cost of their time or concerns  about intrusion in their affairs. The poor too
may be underrepresented;  some are homeless and hard to reach in standard household survey
designs, and some may be physically or socially isolated and thus less easily interviewed.  The
presence of income-dependent compliance  can bias survey-based estimates  of the distribution of
income. However, the direction of bias cannot be assessed on a priori  grounds; for example, if
compliance tends to be lower for both the very poor and the very rich then there will be
potentially offsetting effects on measures of the incidence of poverty. Unit non-response may
well have an offsetting  effect on measured inequality to measurement errors in reported incomes.
The possibility of selective compliance  is commonly ignored in practice.  There are two
exceptions.  The first is found in the strand of the literature on measuring poverty and inequality
in which the survey mean is replaced by average incomes from national accounts.4 This
approach rests on two key assumptions,  namely that the national accounts give a valid estimate
of mean household income and that the discrepancy between the two data sources is distribution
neutral; implying one only needs to make an equi-proportionate  correction at all levels.  Hitherto,
little or no evidence  has been advanced for or against these assumptions.5
4  This is not common practice in empirical work, but there has been a flurry of recent examples,
including Bhalla (2002), Bourguignon  and Morrisson (2002) and Salla-i-Martin (2002). While these
authors acknowledge that they are making these assumptions for computational convenience,  some also
defend the method on the grounds that it allows a correction for under-reporting and non-compliance  in
surveys (Bhalla, 2002; Sala-i-Martin,  2002).
5  For further discussion (in  the context of poverty measurement for India,  though the point is more
general)  see Ravallion (2000).  On the discrepancies  between estimates of mean consumption  from
surveys versus national accounts across countries see Ravallion  (2002).
3A second, more promising approach is based on utilizing geographic  or other observable
differences  in survey response rates. Atkinson and Micklewright (1983) use regional differences
in survey response rates to correct for differential non-response  in the U.K. Family Expenditure
Survey.  The Current Population Survey for the U.S. uses a similar method (Census Bureau,
2000, Chapter  10).  These methods assume that the non-compliance  problem is ignorable within
areas.  However,  this assumption is essentially ad hoc, with no behavioral basis, and there is no a
priori  reason why it would be valid; why would compliance be non-random between areas but
random within them?
The contribution of the present paper is to show that the ignorability assumption can be
relaxed using exactly the same data used in past ad hoc corrections following the second
approach.  We show that it is possible to identify the latent individual probability of survey
compliance as a function of income using the empirical relationship between aggregate
compliance rates across areas and mean incomes by percentile  groups.  Our method recognizes
that the empirical percentile group shares are biased given that there is selective compliance.  We
deal with this problem numerically, by iterating the parameter estimation after revising the
empirical shares consistently with the empirical income effect identified at the previous iteration.
On convergence,  the identified individual compliance probability  given income is used to correct
for bias in the estimated income distribution.  Our approach  deals simultaneously with response
bias within and between areas.
We are thus able to present the first estimates (to our knowledge) of the bias in measured
distributions  due to unit non-response.  While we only present estimates for one country here, the
minimal  data requirements of our method should allow a wide range of applications  in practice.
4We first establish why unit non-response is unlikely to be ignorable using a simple
economic model of compliance choice  (section 2).  We then examine the model's implications
for measures of income poverty and inequality (section 3).  This motivates our effort to test for
an income  effect on compliance.  We outline our empirical method in section 4 and then present
results for the U.S. (section 5).  We offer some conclusions  in section 6.
2.  Income-dependent  suirvey compliance
Survey participation is a matter of individual choice; nobody is obliged to comply with
the statistician's randomized assignment.  There is some perceived utility gain from
compliance-the satisfaction of doing one's civic duty, for example-but there is a cost as well.
Let ye [yp, YR]  be household income per person (yp is the income of the poorest person
and  YR  is for the richest) and c(y)  the cost to the respondent of survey participation (net of any
compensation received for participation).  We assume that  c'(y) 2 0.  This can be rationalized by
assuming that the opportunity cost of the time required to comply rises with income, while the
time itself is roughly independent of income.  More precisely, let  r denote the time required for
the survey interview and normalize total available time to unity. Full income is  y = w +  Xr  where
w is the wage rate and X* is non-wage  income.  The cost of survey participation is then
c(y) = TW= T(y - ,r) with 0 < c'(y) = T < 1  . Nonlinearity of c(y) can arise when  T  varies with y.
Let utility be  u[y - c(y)d, d] where d= 1 if one chooses to comply and d=O if not. The
function u is strictly increasing in both arguments.  The utility gain from compliance  is:
g(y) = u[y - c(y),  1]  - u(y,  0)  (1)
with slope:
g'(y) = uy [y - c(y), 11  - c'(y)] - uy (y, 0)  (2)
5where subscripts denote partial derivatives.  We assume that the probability of compliance  is a
strictly increasing common function of the utility gain. This simple model can generate a wide
range of outcomes for the relationship between compliance  and income.  We consider some
special cases.
From (2), it is evident that compliance  falls monotonically  with income if and only if:
c'(y) > 1-  uy(y,O)  for ally
Uy[y - C(y), 1]
A simple case in which this holds is when the cost of participation  increases monotonically with
income (c'(y)  > 0)  and the marginal utility of income is independent of survey participation,  i.e.,
uY(y,  0) = uy[y - c(y), 1].  Then  g'(y) = -uy(.)c'(y) < 0 for all y.
However, the opposite result can also be obtained, whereby compliance rises with
income.  For example, suppose instead that the cost of participation  is independent of income
( c'(y) = 0 ), implying that g'(y) = uy [y - c(y), 1] - uy (y, 0) . If there is diminishing marginal
utility of income  and utility is separable between income and compliance (uy (y, 1)  = uy (y, 0))
then g'(y) > 0; the poor will be less likely to participate.
Without separability,  the outcome depends on whether compliance raises or lowers the
marginal utility of income, which is not obvious on a priori  grounds. If compliance leads to a
higher marginal utility of income then again  g'(y) > 0.  If it lowers the marginal utility of
income then the income effect could go either way.  Suppose that the difference in income effect
on the marginal utility of income dominates at low incomes,  uy [-c(y), 1] > uy (0, 0), while the
adverse effect of compliance  on the marginal utility of income dominates  at high y, i.e.,
6uY [1- c(y),  1] < uY (1,  0).  Then one can again find an inverted-U pattern  in which middle-income
groups are more likely to participate than either tail of the distribution.
Other special cases can deliver this inverted-U relationship.  For instance, assume that: (i)
the cost of compliance is a non-negative and strictly increasing and convex in income,  c'(y) > 0,
c 0(y)  > 0  with c'(yp) = 0; (ii) utility is separable between income and compliance and (iii) for
the richest person, the cost of participation  is negligibly small, i.e.,  lim uy  - c(y)] = uy (y).
Then separability implies that we can re-write  (2) as:
g'(y) = -uyAy - c(y)]c'(y) + uy[y - c(y)] - uy (y)  (3)
The first term on the right-hand side is negative while the second is positive, given declining
marginal utility.  At low incomes the second term will dominate (since  c'(y) will be small) and
hence  g'(y) > 0  at low y.  At high incomes, by contrast, the first term will dominate and hence
g'(y) < 0.  In other words, the gains will tend to be highest for middle-income groups.
Notice  that in this model,  the introduction of a fixed fee paid to those who agree to
participate  will increase the probability of participation,  but it can make the income gradient of
compliance even more negative.  This will happen if the cost of compliance rises less than one-
to-one with income, and there is declining marginal utility of income.
3.  lmplications for poverty and iiAneqjunaLUty  nmeasures
In exploring the theoretical  implications  for the distribution of income, we confine
attention to the special cases discussed above in which the compliance-income relationship  is
either monotonic decreasing or an inverted-U shape.
7Let  F(y) denote the true (unobserved) cumulative  distribution function of income y with
continuous  density functionj(y).  The sample-based estimate is F(y) with corresponding  density
f (y)  and we assume that  F(O) = 0.  The true distribution can be derived from the empirical
distribution by appropriate re-weighting.  The true density function is f (y) = w(y)f(y)  where the
"correction factors"  w(y)  are the inverse probabilities of compliance,  so  w(y) = 0[g(y)]  for a
strictly decreasing  differentiable  function 0.  The corrected distribution function is:
F(y) =  fw(x)f(x)dx  (4)
yp
The expected value of the correction factor is unity, i.e.,  fYR w(x)f (x)dx = 1.
Consider first the case in which compliance falls monotonically with income, i.e.,
w'(y) >0.  On integrating (4) by parts one obtains the following formula for the difference
between the true distribution of income and the empirical distribution:
F(y) - F(y) = [w(y) - l]F(y) - |w'(x)F(x)dx  (5)
yP
It is evident that F(y) <  F(y)  for all y < w'1 (1).  By continuity there must exist an income y
defined as the minimum value of y for which F(y) = F(y).  Following a result proved in
Atkinson (1987), the empirical distribution will then overestimate  the extent of income poverty
for all poverty lines up to  y  and all additive poverty measures  satisfying standard properties.
Notice however, that first-order dominance over all y is not guaranteed by the assumptions made
so far; values of  y for which F(y) > F(y) are possible if compliance rates fall to a sufficiently
low level at high incomes. This is an empirical  question.
8Consider instead the inverted-U relationship of compliance with income.  There are two
points at which no correction to the density function is needed, namely  YL  and  Yu  with
YL  <YYU  w(YL)=W(YU)=l,  w(y)>l  for Y<YL  and  Y>Yu  and w(y)<l  for  YL  <Y<YuU
We also assume that  w'(y) < 0  for all  y < YL  and  w'(y) > 0 for all  y > Yu  though this can be
relaxed somewhat without altering the main results.  From (5):
YL
F(yL)-F(yL) = - w'(x)F(x)dx >O  (6.1)
yP
Yu
F(yu)-F(yU) = - JW'(x)F(x)dx < 0  (6.2)
yP
Intuitively,  both  the  incidence  of  low-incomes  (F(yL))  and  high  incomes  (1-F(yu))  are
underestimated,  given the structure  of the income  effect on compliance.  On noting that:
d[F(y) - F(y)] = [w(y) - l]f(y)  (7)
dy
it is evident that the impact of this pattem of income effects on compliance  is as represented  in
Figure  1. By continuity, there must exist a point y* e (YL,  Yu)  such that F(y ) = F(y0).
Again, for a broad class of poverty measures in the literature and all poverty lines up to  y*,  the
empirical distribution will underestimate the extent of income poverty.  Of course, the same
holds over the entire support of the distribution if nobody has an income greater than yo
(f (y)  = 0  for all  y > y*).  On the other hand, suppose that nobody has an income less than  y
(f(y) = 0  for all  y < ye).  Then the empirical distribution will unambiguously overestimate the
extent of poverty (i.e.,  F(y) < F(y) for all y.)
9Though we omit the detailed analysis, similar arguments can be used to show that the
impact on measured inequality of an income effect on compliance  is also ambiguous, and will
depend (inter alia) on the specific measure of inequality used.  It is easy to see why if we
consider the case in which compliance  falls monotonically  with income, implying that the mean
is underestimated.  Consider the poorest and richest persons, with incomes  yp  and  YR.  The
survey  yields the correct values for these incomes but underestimates  the proportion of people
who have income  YR  and overestimates  the proportion with  yp.  Figure 2 shows how the
income effect on compliance affects the Lorenz curve.  The bold lines are the segments of the
empirical Lorenz curve for the poor and the rich, and the bold dashed lines are the underlying
true Lorenz curve.  The true slope of the lower segment corresponding  to the poorest person is
yp /,  while the slope of the upper most segment is  YR  IP/,  where  ,  is mean income.  The
slopes of both segments of the Lorenz curve will be overestimated by the survey data given that
the empirical mean is underestimated  (,u  > ,u)  since the higher income groups are
underrepresented.  By continuity, the true Lorenz curve must intersect the empirical Lorenz
curve, implying that the effect on inequality is ambiguous,  and will depend crucially on he
measure of inequality used.  If instead compliance rises with income then one can re-interpret
Figure 2 accordingly (bold line is the true Lorenz curve) and see that again there must be an
intersection.
4.  Method for estimating the income  effect  on compliance
While we do not observe the individual probabilities of compliance,  we do observe both
the aggregate response rates by geographic  area and the incomes of complying units.  The
problem is to infer how individual compliance  varies with income from these data.  The observed
10aggregate  response rates by area are unconditional means across the (unknown) conditional
response rates by level of income.  However, the aggregate response rates are not simple un-
weighted means, since if compliance rates vary with income then the population shares by
income level in the survey data actually collected will be wrong.
The fact that we only observe aggregate response rates across geographic  areas implies
that we must impose some aggregation structure  on the problem of estimating the latent
individual income effect on compliance.  We make two key assumptions. Firstly we assume that
the data can be aggregated  in the form of a set of homogeneous income groups with a common
number of groups across all geographic  areas. The population is divided into n income groups
and m geographical  areas, called "states" hereafter.  For the computational  convenience of
having a common data structure across all states, we impose the restriction that the number of
income groups is identical across states.  Since the sample size is unlikely to be constant across
regions this also entails that a degree of aggregation is unavoidable.  In estimating the parameters
of the income effect on compliance,  we further ignore income differences  within a given
(income-state-specific)  group of sampled households. Thus the mean incomes of the n by m
groups become fixed data points in our method for estimating the income effect on compliance
and hence correcting the sample weights for selective compliance.
The second assumption involves  aggregation of the latent heterogeneity.  Here we assume
that the heterogeneity in compliance at given income can be captured by a common additive
area-specific error term. Given that our method relies on the observation of state-specific
compliance aggregates only (rather than by income group, which is of course intrinsically
unobservable), it is impossible to further decompose the aggregate (state-specific) error term.
11Let  Pij denote the (unobserved)  probability of compliance  for a person in income group
i=l,..,n living in statej=l,..,m.  The probability of compliance varies with the mean income  y,
of group i in statej according to:
PJi  = P(yiJ;  P) + £,  (8)
where P is a smooth function with one or more parameters,  fl, and e,  is a zero-mean error term.
We assume the following parametric form:
P(yij;  ,B) = L(4o + Al In  y,  + ,82 (In yi)2 )  (9)
where L(x) = ex (  + ex)  is the logistic function.  This specification is both sufficiently flexible
to test the scenarios developed  in section 3 and ensures that the observed mean response  rate  P
is bounded within the unit interval.




where  wj  is the proportion of the population of statej who belong to income group i, and
n
E,-E W.,E,  (11)
i=l
If there was no selective compliance then for equal sized groups (quintiles, say) we have
W,j  = 1/ n  . With suitable parameterization  of the function P(y, ;  ,8) we can then estimate (10)
using standard econometric  methods.  However, selective compliance complicates matters.  To
correct for this we should be re-weighting the data according to the differences  in response rates
across income groups,  so that the correct weight take the form:
12w  =  for all (i,j)  (12)
k=l
We proceed iteratively.  First we estimate (10) based on the assumption that compliance
is distribution neutral,  i.e.  w0 = 1/n  for all (i,j), where the superscript "O"  refers to the starting
WU
value. This yields a vector of parameter estimates,  /i0 , and state-specific  error terms.  However,
the error terms by income  group are not identified.  Under our assumption that the error term is
common to all income groups in a given state, we obtain an initial vector of estirnated
compliance probabilities:
pi  =P(Yv;/30 )+.C  (13)
These in turn can be used to re-weight the data for the next iteration using:
w,,  u  =  ,(  v )(14)
k=l
We then re-estimate (10) using (14) for these new weights,  giving the regression:
pj  = Jv  ,P(yi,;fi) +  (15)
i=,
This gives revised estimates of the parameters and residuals.  We iterate this procedure until the
estimated coefficients  (and hence the estimated proportions  of the population in each income
group and area)  converge.
Finally, we use the vector of parameter estimates from the last iteration and each
complying household's per capita income to infer the latent compliance probability for that
household.  The inverse of this probability gives the household-specific  correction factor that
allows us to estimate the corrected income distribution fiunction defined in (4). Notice that this
13last step  does not require the first aggregation  assumption,  described above which is only used in
estimating the parameters and state-specific error terms.
5.  Application  to the U.S. income distribution
Data on survey response rates across geographical  areas are often available  from survey
producers.  A case in point is the March 2001 supplement of the US Current Population Survey
(CPS).6 In addition to detailed data on incomes, the CPS contains  geographically referenced
information on compliance (Census Bureau, 2000, Chapter 7).  We define non-compliance  as
what the Census Bureau refers to a "type A non-interviews," which refer to households  assigned
for interview but for which no usable data were collected because household members explicitly
refused to be interviewed or were absent during the interviewing period.7 The March 2001 CPS
has a sample size of 17,788 households (net of other non-interview types) of which  1,461 were
classified as type A non-interviews.  In addition, we also treat the 134 households that were
interviewed but refused to answer the income questions as non-compliant.  Together this implies
an overall non-response  rate of about 9%.
The CPS has its own procedures in trying to adjust for non-response (described in Census
Bureau, 2000, Chapter  10).8  In dealing with unit non-response, the CPS assumes that the
problem is ignorable once primary sampling units with non-responding households are grouped
together within other matched geographic  areas (typically within the same state).  The Census
Bureau acknowledges  that this may or may not be valid.  The data set only gives one weight
6  The CPS data and survey methodology details are available for the US Census Bureau and can be
accessed on-line at: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income.html.
7  Other types of "non-interviews"  refer to cases were the residence was found to be demolished,
under construction,  etc. These are  less likely to bias the income  distribution because the household  is
likely to be no longer the premises for a variety of reasons that are not correlated with income.
8  For a critical  assessment of the imputation methods used by the Census Bureau in correcting
estimates for income non-response see Lillard, Smith and Welch (1986).
14(called "final weight") for each household,  and that weight reflects various adjustments,
including for non-response and sample design.  We cannot disentangle the CPS adjustment for
non-response  from other factors.  For this reason, we chose to ignore the CPS weights.  So, for
the purpose of our exercise, neither our "empirical" nor "corrected" distributions of income have
used the CPS weights, though both distributions  are household-size weighted.
The sample was designed to be representative  of the US at the state level, giving
j=l,.  ..,51  geographical  areas. We set a minimum sample size of 30 for any state-income  group
combination.  Since the smallest sample size for any state is 150, this means that we set n=5.
Thus, we divide the sample for each state into quintiles, based on the state-level per capita
income distribution quintiles. We also test the sensitivity of our results to this assumption.
Non-response  rates vary from 3.2% in Alabama to 19.6% in the District of Columbia
(Table  1).  There is no significant correlation between sample size and compliance  rates. State-
level average income on the other hand is correlated with compliance,  and this correlation is
strongest for the top income quintile and weakest for the bottom quintile (see Figure 3). The
mean incomes by quintile are also given in Table 1.
The specification in equation (9) did not yield an estimate for P2 that was statistically
significantly different from zero so we set /2=0.  The linear specification did produce significant
parameter estimates at each iteration (Table 2) indicating that higher income negatively affects
the propensity to comply; Table 2 gives the parameter estimates.9 The estimated coefficients
(Figure 4) and reweighed shares of the population in each income group in each state (Figure 5)
converged up to 3 decimal places after 9 iterations.
9  For each iteration,  we used the standard Gauss-Newton  non-linear estimation method and all
parameter  estimates converged.
15Our results indicate that ignoring selective compliance  according to income  appreciably
understates the proportion of the population in the richest income per capita quintile and
overstates the population shares in the bottom four quintiles.  The highest income quintile is
estimated to comprise 24% of the population after correcting for its lower probability of survey
compliance.  By contrast, the poorest quintile in the unadjusted data actually comprises  18% of
the population.
Table 3 gives the original and corrected mean incomes by 20 equal fractiles (the third
column, labeled n=6, will be discussed below.)  After our correction for selective non-
compliance, the overall mean rises by 23%,  from $21,576 per capita to $26,454.  However, the
correction  is clearly not distribution-neutral;  the proportionate  adjustment rises from about 5%  at
the bottom to over 54% at the top.
Figure 6 gives the Lorenz curves, with enlargements of the extreme  lower and upper ends
shown in Figure 7. (Focus on the n=5 case; we will explain the  n=6 case shortly.) The Lorenz
curves intersect as predicted in section 2; thus the qualitative  effect on measured inequality
cannot be predicted on a priori  grounds.  However, it is plain from Figure 6 that the predominant
effect of our correction is a downward  shift of the Lorenz curve, implying higher inequality by
most measures.  The Gini index increases  appreciably from 45.05% to 50.76%  on correcting  for
our estimates of the income effect on compliance.
The effect on the levels distribution of income per capita can be seen from Figure 8.
Naturally, this also reflects  the impact on the mean.  It can be seen that the impact on poverty
incidence is small for poverty lines commonly used in the U.S., giving poverty rates around  12%
(Census Bureau, 2001); Figure 9 gives a blow-up for the lower 30%. However,  there is still first-
16order dominance, implying that poverty measures  are unambiguously overestimated under the
standard assumption in practice of ignorable non-response.
A striking feature of our findings is that so much of the impact is at the upper end of the
distribution,  notably the top quintile or so (Table 3).  So our results may be sensitive to
aggregation at this end of the distribution.  To test this, we split the highest-income quintile into
two and re-run the estimation method.  The method converged at a lower estimate (in absolute
value) for,ti8  of  -1.553,  with a standard  error of 0.243.  Table 3 gives the conditional means for
this case; the pattern  is similar, but the upward adjustmnent is lower.  The upward adjustment
needed to be consistent with selective compliance rises from only 3% at the bottom to 30%  at the
top.  Instead of a revised mean of $26,454 we obtained $24,291.  Figures 6 and 8 also give the
Lorenz curves  and distribution  functions for this case (labeled n=6).  Instead of an upward
revision of the Gini index to 50.75% (from 45.05%) we now obtain 48.29%. There is negligible
impact on the cumulative distribution function at the lower end.
While quantitative magnitudes are somewhat sensitive to this change to the estimation
method, the qualitative results are not.  The problem of selective compliance is clearly not
ignorable in estimating standard summary statistics from income surveys.  And even if one is
willing to assume that the national accounts provide a better basis for setting the mean, the bias is
clearly far from distribution-neutral.
6.  Con Rus$ons
We have argued that there is likely to be an income effect on survey compliance, though
the direction of bias in poverty or inequality measures could go either way in theory.  So it is an
empirical question.  Past empirical work has either ignored the problem of selective compliance
in surveys or made essentially ad hoc corrections.  We have shown how the latent income effect
17on compliance  can be estimated consistently with the available data on average response rates
and the measured distribution of income across geographic  areas.  Thus we are able to re-weight
the raw data to correct for the problem.
On implementing  our method using US data, we find that the problem is not ignorable.
We can also reject the assumptions made in past ad hoc correction methods. We find a highly
significant negative  income effect on survey compliance.  While we do not find strict Lorenz
dominance, inequality tends to be appreciably higher after correcting for selective compliance.
Thus we find that unit non-response has the opposite impact on inequality to the problem of
classical measurement error in reported incomes that has been studied in past work in the
literature.  A sizeable upward revision to the overall mean is also called for to correct for
selective compliance.  In terms of the impact on the incidence of poverty, the downward bias in
the mean tends to offset the downward bias in measured inequality. The tendency for low income
groups to be over-represented  (because of their higher compliance probabilities)  still means that
the poverty rate tends to be over-estimated,  though the impact on poverty incidence is small up
to poverty lines normally used in the U.S.  We find some sensitivity of the quantitative results to
changing the number of income groups one identifies in the estimation method, though our
qualitative  conclusions  are robust.
There can be no presumption that even our qualitative  results will hold elsewhere.
Possibly in poorer settings one will find greater under-representation of the poor than in the US.
Or one might find a less (more) steep income gradient of compliance in countries with lower
(higher) inequality than the US.  These are conjectures.  However, the data and computational
demands of the method we have proposed are not great, so other applications  are possible.
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20Table 1. Sample characteristics
Mean  Sample size  Mean log per capita income per ii quintile
State  compliance  Households  Individuals  i=I  i=2  i=3  z=4  i=5
rate
Alabama  0.968  250  620  8.32  9.12  9.53  10.01  10.85
Idaho  0.960  250  612  8.55  9.24  9.69  10.08  10.83
West Virginia  0.955  245  558  8.48  9.13  9.55  9.95  10.54
Utah  0.955  198  613  8.48  9.29  9.73  10.13  10.90
North Dakota  0.950  219  495  8.72  9.33  9.76  10.06  10.69
Mississippi  0.950  199  466  8.51  9.16  9.56  10.01  10.65
Louisiana  0.949  198  466  8.45  9.10  9.56  9.96  10.66
Nebraska  0.949  254  586  8.72  9.47  9.84  10.29  10.83
Montana  0.942  225  498  8.65  9.30  9.71  10.05  10.86
South Dakota  0.940  235  523  8.68  9.32  9.76  10.09  10.71
Wyoming  0.938  242  568  8.66  9.29  9.69  10.16  10.95
Iowa  0.936  219  514  8.87  9.36  9.71  10  12  10.84
Delaware  0.935  168  441  8.69  9.50  9.87  10.29  11.11
Florida  0.932  942  2,161  8.65  9.36  9.79  10.19  10.92
Minnesota  0.930  244  557  8.95  9.59  9.92  10.31  11.28
Tennessee  0.929  225  511  8.45  9.17  9.60  10.08  10.98
Virginia  0.928  263  633  8.82  9.52  9.90  10.33  11.18
Indiana  0.928  235  536  8.69  9.40  9.77  10.20  10.82
Wisconsin  0.925  268  636  8.85  9.52  9.91  10.24  11.02
Arkansas  0.925  253  576  8.38  9.08  9.47  9.91  10.85
South Carolma  0.924  171  363  8.74  9.34  9.73  10.15  10.80
Oklahoma  0.923  285  667  8.23  9.13  9.61  10.13  10.86
Vermont  0.922  192  415  8.62  9.42  9.90  10.19  11.13
Oregon  0.921  203  478  8.61  9.43  9.83  10.23  10 92
Massachusetts  0.921  403  944  8.75  9.48  9.92  10.35  11.22
Maine  0.920  188  408  8.76  9.41  9.79  10.20  10 88
Nevada  0.917  240  624  8.69  9.34  977  10.21  11.00
Kansas  0.915  235  514  8.78  9.40  9.85  10.28  10.84
Ohio  0.914  629  1,485  8.78  9.46  9.85  10.24  10.97
Washington  0.913  230  546  8.56  9.40  9.82  10.26  11.07
North Carolina  0.913  436  1,007  8.61  9.26  9.75  10.19  10.85
Missouri  0.912  239  539  8.90  9.56  9.95  10.32  11.03
Texas  0.911  961  2,439  8.29  9.17  9.63  10.13  11.10
Michigan  0.910  577  1,401  8.72  9.45  9.85  10.26  11.04
New Mexico  0.909  309  760  8.24  9.13  9.59  9.99  10.77
Georgia  0.909  253  579  8.56  9.30  9.75  10.24  11.09
Kentucky  0.909  219  503  8.67  9.22  9.69  10.23  11.07
Colorado  0.906  255  627  8.98  9.68  9.98  10 45  11.13
Arizona  0.902  287  688  8.56  9.26  9.71  10.17  11.11
Connecticut  0.901  182  412  8.73  9.61  9.99  10.36  11.05
Illinois  0.901  744  1,841  8.70  9.50  9.91  10.32  11  01
Pennsylvania  0.896  724  1,650  8.75  9.44  9.88  10.32  11.16
Alaska  0.896  193  492  8.60  9.43  9.94  10.31  11.01
California  0.888  1,583  4,177  8.41  9.26  9.75  10.28  11.19
New Jersey  0.885  582  1,340  8.76  9.54  9.96  10.35  11.09
Rhode Island  0.880  150  304  8.82  9.42  9.85  10.36  11  32
New York  0.874  1,183  2,702  8  51  9.30  9.77  10 22  11.07
Hawaii  0.866  179  426  8 72  9.54  9.98  10.46  11.10
New Hampshire  0.853  191  407  9 03  9.67  10.06  10.39  10 93
Maryland  0.842  209  432  8.85  9.57  9.96  10.41  11.19
Dist. Of Columbia  0.804  224  384  8.46  9.30  10.00  1062  11.42
21Table 2. Parameter estimates and corrected population shares
Mean proportion (%)  of the population by quintile
i=l  i=2  i=3  i=4  i=5
Iteration (t)  PO  fit  (richest)  (poorest)
0  24.682  -2.168  20.00  20.00  2000  20.00  20.00
(3.595)  (0.337)
1  18.997  -1.613  25.87  19.43  18.53  18.18  17.99
2  21.210  -1.828  23.64  19.91  19.16  18.78  18.52
(2.806)  (0.263)
(20.442  -1.753  24.36  19.76  18.95  18.58  18.35 (2.656)  (0.249)
(20.715  -1.780  24.10  19.81  19.02  18.65  18.41 (2.709)  (0.254)
(  20 619  -1.770  24.19  19.79  19.00  18.63  18.39
(2.690)  (0.252)
6  20.653  -1.774  24.16  19.80  19.01  18.64  18 40 (2.698)  (0.253)
7  20.641  -1.773  24.17  19.80  19.00  18.63  18.40
(2.694)  (0 253)
8  20.645  -1.773  24  16  19.80  19.01  18.64  18.40
(2.695)  (0.253)
9  20.644  -1.773  24.17  19.80  19.00  18.63  18.40 (2.695)  (0.253)
1  0  20.644  -1.773  24.17  19.80  19.00  18.63  18.40
(I  695)  (0 253)
22Table 3: Mean  nimome with/without correctdoi  for income-dependent  co
Fractile  (ranked by  Mean income ($/person/year)
income per person)  Empirical distribution  Corrected distribution  Corrected distribution
(n=5)  (n=6)
0  - 5  1,968  2,068  2,034
5  - 10  3,999  4,199  4,129
10- 15  5,543  5,845  5,745
15-20  6,863  7,198  7,087
20 - 25  8,110  8,570  8,406
25 - 30  9,389  9,941  9,746
30 - 35  10,637  11,308  11,073
35 - 40  11,995  12,829  12,540
40 - 45  13,438  14,391  14,062
45 - 50  14,877  15,876  15,513
50 - 55  16,340  17,604  17,139
55 - 60  18,046  19,579  19,015
60 - 65  19,967  21,783  21,066
65 - 70  22,172  24,433  23,578
70 - 75  24,801  27,627  26,470
75 - 80  28,071  31,811  30,252
80 - 85  32,433  37,476  35,379
85 - 90  38,636  46,740  43,119
90 - 95  49,971  64,246  57,499
95 - 100  94,234  145,466  121,895
21,576  26,454  24,287
23Figure 1:  Pattern of bias for an inverted-U relationship between compliance and income
F(y) - F(y)
0  YL  Y  'Yu
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